The end of the Indigenous struggle is not an institution: Cheng Xu, ‘Autonomy, interrupted: constitutional weakening of indigenous activism from civil war to civil society’, World Development, 196, 2025, #107157 | settler colonial studies blog

The end of the Indigenous struggle is not an institution: Cheng Xu, ‘Autonomy, interrupted: constitutional weakening of indigenous activism from civil war to civil society’, World Development, 196, 2025, #107157

13Aug25

Abstract: This study examines why democratization efforts in the Global South often fail to deliver meaningful self-determination for indigenous peoples. Focusing on the Cordillera region in the Philippines, where indigenous communities waged a successful insurgency against the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s, I investigate why the post-conflict transition, despite constitutional and legal reforms, failed to realize the movement’s central demands. For development practitioners and scholars, this case offers critical insights into how even democratic institutional and legal frameworks may entrench, rather than resolve, historical injustices against indigenous communities. The central question explored is how do postwar constitutional frameworks shape the capacity of indigenous movements to secure autonomy? Why do legal reforms sometimes weaken, rather than empower, these movements? Using qualitative fieldwork and over 50 interviews with activists, civil society leaders, and government officials, I reveal some of the unintended consequences of the 1986 peace agreement between the indigenous rebellion and the Philippine state. I find that while the postwar democratic transition created new legal pathways for advocacy, it simultaneously entrenched neocolonial mechanisms, such as the Regalian Doctrine, that preserved state control over ancestral domains and shifted bargaining disadvantages onto the indigenous opposition. These findings challenge dominant assumptions that democratization and legal recognition automatically empower marginalized groups. Instead, I show how postwar frameworks can fragment movements, co-opt moderate factions, and repress dissenting ones, thereby reinforcing state dominance. This study reveals how states are better positioned during critical periods of democratization and can use peace negotiations to institutionalize control without meaningful concessions. Broadly, this research demonstrates how democratic constitutional orders can legitimize the deferral, and erosion, of indigenous self-determination in the Global South.

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