Libertarian settler indigenism: Andy Lamey, ‘Libertarian Support for Indigenous Rights’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2025

01Oct25

Abstract: The most prominent philosophical defenders of indigenous rights have been egalitarian liberals such as Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten. Libertarians, on the other hand, are often critical of such arrangements. Given the prevalence of this view, it is natural to think that no form of libertarianism is compatible with a distinct set of legal rights for native people. But the work of one of libertarianism’s most distinguished defenders is striking in the degree to which it ratifies the liberal case for indigenous rights. In support of this claim, I offer a reconstruction of arguments drawn from the work of Robert Nozick. I start with his libertarian framework for utopia and the many ways in which it legitimizes separate and distinct native communities. I then note how any state, even a minimal one, inevitably places indigenous minorities at a disadvantage. Given this, Nozick’s libertarianism lends support to the liberal conception of native rights as a form of compensation for state-imposed disadvantage. I justify this claim by noting how a libertarian principle of compensation overlaps with and validates the understanding of compensation that features in the liberal rationale for native rights. While my primary motivation is to bolster the legitimacy of indigenous rights, I also hope to show how the aspects of libertarianism that vindicate such rights have bearing on broader debates about Nozick’s work. Charles Mills, for example, has argued that Nozick’s libertarianism displays a colonialist mindset, one that Mills takes to be representative of Anglo-American political philosophy as a whole. That fact that libertarianism lends support to a theory of indigenous rights suggests that it does not suffer from this and other charges.