Abstract: The most prominent philosophical defenders of indigenous rights have been egalitarian liberals such as Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten. Libertarians, on the other hand, are often critical of such arrangements. Given the prevalence of this view, it is natural to think that no form of libertarianism is compatible with a distinct set of legal rights for native people. But the work of one of libertarianism’s most distinguished defenders is striking in the degree to which it ratifies the liberal case for indigenous rights. In support of this claim, I offer a reconstruction of arguments drawn from the work of Robert Nozick. I start with his libertarian framework for utopia and the many ways in which it legitimizes separate and distinct native communities. I then note how any state, even a minimal one, inevitably places indigenous minorities at a disadvantage. Given this, Nozick’s libertarianism lends support to the liberal conception of native rights as a form of compensation for state-imposed disadvantage. I justify this claim by noting how a libertarian principle of compensation overlaps with and validates the understanding of compensation that features in the liberal rationale for native rights. While my primary motivation is to bolster the legitimacy of indigenous rights, I also hope to show how the aspects of libertarianism that vindicate such rights have bearing on broader debates about Nozick’s work. Charles Mills, for example, has argued that Nozick’s libertarianism displays a colonialist mindset, one that Mills takes to be representative of Anglo-American political philosophy as a whole. That fact that libertarianism lends support to a theory of indigenous rights suggests that it does not suffer from this and other charges.


Abstract: This chapter highlights the intensified impacts of settler colonialism and human-induced environmental crises on Indigenous communities in Bangladesh, with a focus on the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), coastal regions, and wetland areas. It examines the multifaceted challenges these communities face, including land disputes, deforestation, large-scale development projects, and biodiversity loss, all of which are exacerbated by inequities in policy-making and governance frameworks. The chapter highlights how these issues are deeply rooted in historical and ongoing colonial practices that marginalize Indigenous populations, disrupt traditional land-based knowledge, and undermine sustainable practices. The chapter aims to achieve several key objectives. First, it explores the primary human-created factors, such as land encroachment, deforestation, and industrial development, that heighten climate vulnerabilities for Indigenous communities. Second, it centers the voices of Indigenous Elders and Knowledge-keepers to document their perspectives on these crises and the solutions they envision. Third, it emphasizes the importance of traditional land-based knowledge and cultural practices as critical strategies for climate adaptation and resilience. Finally, the chapter advocates for transformative policy changes, including the recognition of Indigenous land rights, support for self-determination, and the integration of community-led approaches into climate policies. By addressing these objectives, the chapter underscores the urgent need to decolonize climate governance and adopt collaborative approaches that amplify Indigenous voices and knowledge.



Abstract: Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that victims of gross injustices and epistemic harms not only have a right to know, but also a right to be known, i.e., to share and have their experiences heard. This right is associated with a duty to provide epistemic reparations, notably in bearing witness to victims. The epistemic harms with which Lackey is concerned are features of settler colonialism that call for such epistemic reparations. I seek to raise caution about the pursuit of epistemic reparations, however, especially through bearing witness and testimony, in settler colonial contexts. I argue that settler colonial epistemic environments constitute morasses of unknowing, where settlers are subjectified in ways that severely burden their capacity to properly understand and know victims of epistemic harms. In settler colonial contexts, I argue, epistemic reparations through bearing witness and testimonies risk being both unproductive and pernicious. They risk being unproductive precisely because victims are at risk of not being properly understood without transforming the material and subjective features of the settler colonial epistemic environment. They further risk being pernicious given settler colonial dynamics that tend to defuse the critical potential of testimonies. To ensure a more thorough pursuit of the right to be known, we must therefore also consider the required decolonial transformation of the structures and subjectivities that make epistemic harm possible.






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