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Abstract: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada states the revitalization and application of Indigenous laws is vital for re‐establishing respectful relations in Canada. It is also vital for restoring and maintaining safety, peace and order in Indigenous communities. This thesis explores how to accomplish this objective. It examines current challenges, resources and opportunities for recovering, learning and practicing Indigenous laws. It develops a highly structured methodology for serious and sustained engagement with Indigenous legal traditions, based on reviewing existing methods, then combining the methods of two leading Indigenous legal scholars, John Borrows and Val Napoleon. This method approaches Indigenous stories as jurisprudence. It uses adapted legal analysis and synthesis to identify Indigenous legal principles from stories and oral histories and organize these principles into a rigorous and transparent analytical framework. These legal principles can then be readily accessed, understood and applied. This thesis demonstrates this adapted legal analysis method is teachable, transferable and replicable, using research outcomes of Cree legal principles responding to violence, harms and conflicts. Through the example of a foundational Cree legal principle, “wah-­ko-­to-­win” (our inter-­relatedness), it demonstrates how this method can also deepen our understanding of background or ‘meta-­principles’ within Indigenous legal traditions, which can help us interpret, apply and change laws in legitimate ways. It then demonstrates how the research outcomes from this method may be understood and applied by Indigenous communities, through a case study exploring the development of a contemporary Cree criminal justice process based on Cree legal principles, by and with the Aseniwuche Winewak. Finally, it examines the current narratives about the appalling rates of violence against and over‐incarceration of Indigenous people in Canada and the existing gap between legitimacy and enforcement. It proposes Indigenous legal reasoning as a bridge, and develops the conceit of the “reasonable Cree person” to examine whether principled Cree legal reasoning can be explicitly recognized and implemented within Canada’s current political and legal systems. It concludes that, while there are many potential spaces for doing so, more intellectual work is necessary first, in which both Indigenous and non-­Indigenous people engage with Indigenous laws as laws. It is this kind of deep engagement that is necessary to effectively and respectfully operationalize the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s compelling calls for greater recognition of Indigenous laws in Canada.




Abstract: The New Zealand and Canadian Crowns are guided in their dealings with
Indigenous peoples by common law fiduciary duties. In both countries, these
duties have evolved into the constitutional principle of the ‘honour of the
Crown’, which requires governments to consult with Indigenous peoples when
contemplating legislative and executive action affecting their distinctive
interests, and to accommodate those interests where appropriate. To date, no
comparable common law duty has emerged in Australia. This article revisits
Toohey J’s remarkable, but under-analysed, judgment in Mabo v Queensland
(No 2) (‘Mabo (No 2)’), in which His Honour found that Australian Crowns
owe a general fiduciary duty to Indigenous peoples, arising by operation of law
from the ‘circumstances of the relationship’ (rather than from a treaty or
express undertaking). The judgment continues to influence contemporary
Australian courts and, in the absence of a High Court of Australia majority
finding to the contrary, the possibility remains that a general fiduciary duty may
yet emerge as a principle of Australian common law. The article argues that
fiduciary obligations of this kind are sorely needed in Australia, because the
High Court has not accepted that relational or consultative obligations to
Indigenous peoples attend the Crowns’ exercise of the ‘race power’, or that
these obligations are a precondition of the Crowns’ reliance on the ‘special
measures’ exception in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). As it stands,
Australian law permits and enables a degree of governmental unilateralism that
is not compatible with the role of the Crown as a fiduciary. This article explores
the possibility, suggested by Toohey J’s judgment in Mabo (No 2), that the
common law of native title could yet be the wellspring of general fiduciary
principles that could guide the conduct of Australian Crowns in their dealings
with Indigenous peoples.