Abstract: My dissertation explores ways that engaging with the history of settler colonialism should matter to work in contemporary political philosophy. I begin by critiquing the state of the debate in the philosophy of immigration. The most popular arguments for open borders–the view that people should nearly always be able to live and travel wherever they wish– are parallel to arguments historically made to justify settler colonialism. Unless seriously qualified, these arguments have the counterintuitive consequence that most historical settler colonialism was justified; they also have dire consequences for the rights of indigenous peoples today. However, most of the popular arguments for immigration restrictions also fail to account for the rights of indigenous peoples. How, then, can we understand the principled basis of those rights? I offer my own justification of territorial rights and (some) border controls based on NeoRoman republicanism. This is the view that the purpose of political institutions is to protect people from domination, where domination is understood as subjection to the arbitrary will of another. There is a growing literature on the question of what (if anything) is wrong with colonialism apart from obvious wrongs that are often perpetrated by colonizers such as physical violence, enslavement, and the displacement of colonized people from their homes. I argue that colonialism is a wrong even in the absence of violence etc. because it involves domination in the sense just mentioned. Furthermore, I argue that rights to control territory and impose (some) restrictions on immigration are justified as a means of preventing domination by settlers. Philip Pettit, the most influential neo-Roman republican, has argued that a state is necessary to secure non-domination. This would seem to imply that my justification of territorial rights as a means of preventing domination does not apply to non-state societies. In response to this objection, I draw on defenses of non-state forms of governance in American Indian/First Nations philosophy as well as the actual history of non-state societies to rebut Pettit’s arguments: non-state societies can successfully protect their members from domination and have actually done so.



Abstract: This paper argues that the ‘living with nature’ movement and technocratic responses, such as Nature-based Solutions, are ideological fantasies of curation. Technocratic responses tend to reify a neo-liberal notion of the nonhuman as an ‘ecosystem service’ to humans which can be nurtured, abandoned or sacrificed. The so-called ‘living with nature’ debate often hinges on anthropocentric notions of whether human/nonhuman habitation is compossible. Arguments that urban residents should ‘get close to nature’, frequently assume that living with nature is ‘good’ for the planet and, in particular, good for people. Critics, however, point out the zoonotic threats which arise from encounters with nonhuman-borne pathogens and vectors. Planned interventions involve censorship, editing and curation. We explain curation as a power-laden activity of selection and organisation, inclusion and exclusion which, in relation to urban planning, perpetuates settler colonialism. This paper argues the need to appreciate that many human and nonhuman residents are uninvited guests in nonhuman habitat on unceded Indigenous lands. In agreement with Smith that ‘ecological disruption is a symptom of a way of life — an imperial mode of existence’ which perpetuates the colonial settler regime, this paper suggests that many planners, developers and suburban dwellers in Australia demonstrate what Baldwin  terms ‘culpable innocence’. This is not an innocence of blameless lack of knowledge, but rather a disavowal that settler colonialism, land fragmentation and urban expansion have caused, and continue to be implicated in, the disruption and destruction of hundreds of thousands of human and non-human lives. Australia, and its urban fringes in particular, are antagonistic landscapes. As Sen explains, antagonistic landscapes ‘require the erasure of what already exists’, where powerful actors antagonise ‘unwanted’ communities of humans and non-humans. Colonisation, therefore, is ongoing, undertaken with the complicity of planners as space curators. In the view of the authors, planners must attend to inherited settler-colonial practices of curating nonhuman life and death in settler cities. It is time for planners to ask the question about decoloniality. Decoloniality, unlike decolonisation, does not assume that colonialism has ended and it can, therefore, be historicised. Decolonisation, as popularly used, risks domestication, recentring whiteness and resettling theory in one more form of settler colonialism. Decoloniality, in contrast, seeks to delink from Western-centric epistemologies that silence or marginalise non-white voices. It seeks to transgress the borders of Western thinking, to avoid universalism and emphasise the epistemic locus of enunciation of the human and nonhuman subjects.