Abstract: Victims of colonial, Indigenous child-removal policies have attracted public expressions of compassion from Indigenous and settler-state political leaders in Canada since the 1990s. This public compassion has fueled legal and political mechanisms, leveraging resources for standardized interventions said to “heal” these victims: cash payments, a truth-telling forum, therapy. These claims to healing provide an entry-point for analyzing how and why the figure of the Indigenous child-victim, past and present, is morally and politically useful for settler-states and their public cultures. I use the formulation of “settler-humanitarianism” to express how liberal interventions of care and protection, intended to ameliorate Indigenous suffering, align with settler-colonialism’s enduring goal of Indigenous elimination (Wolfe 2006). Removal of Indigenous children was integral to the late nineteenth-century formation of the Canadian and Australian settler-states. Missionaries and colonial administrators represented these practices as humanitarian rescue from depraved familial conditions. Settler-humanitarians have long employed universalizing moral registers, such as “idleness” and “neglect,” to compel state interventions into Indigenous families. More recently, “trauma” has emerged as a humanitarian signifier compelling urgent action. These settler-humanitarian registers do political work. Decontextualized representations of Indigenous children as victims negate children as social actors, obscure the particularities of how collective Indigenous suffering flows from settler-colonial dispossession, and oppose children’s interests with those of their kin, community, and nation. I analyze how and why Aboriginal healing as settler-humanitarianism has been taken up by many Indigenous leaders alongside settler-state agents, and examine the ongoing social and political effects of the material and discursive interventions it has spawned.



Abstract: This dissertation contributes to debates on processes of nation building and their relationship to indigenous politics across the Canada/US border in the Pacific Northwest of North America. Specifically, I chronicle the various political, cultural, and environmental strategies taken by the Coast Salish Tribes and First Nations to overcome the obstacles presented by the Canada/US border in the post-9/11 era of increased securitization. Their tactics and strategies rely on the reprisal of oral history and tradition to reunite as an ethnic nation that was slowly transformed during state and nation building processes throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Today, the Coast Salish are engaged in processes of decolonization by attempting to symbolically erase the international border that separates them.

An annual Canoe Journey celebrates the revitalization of a centuries old tradition of canoe travel that connected communities up and down the coast thus using geography to make the case for a unified group. A new political organization aims to bring back traditional Coast Salish governance practices to protect and restore the Salish Sea by placing indigenous knowledge front and center and inviting the states to participate. Environmental protests surrounding the permitting process for oil pipelines crossing indigenous lands in Canada have enabled the American-based Coast Salish to intervene in the government process by appealing to cross-border kinship ties. Taken collectively, through the data presented in this dissertation, I argue that the Coast Salish are appropriating the term applied to them over a century ago to erase the political border that separates them by foregrounding their transnational, collective identity. This emergent national identity challenges existing theories of nationalism and its relationship to the state and illustrates how the border itself is implicated in the process. I argue that the ways in which the Coast Salish respond to a security-sensitive border mirrors that of how they have long handled interactions with the settler colonial state.


Taiwan exists in the between. In historical terms, Taiwan has existed, and continues to exist, in and between various iterations of colonial occupation: from seventeenth-century Dutch rule and the resulting Han settler colonialism to twentieth-century Japanese occupation and the current colonial occupation of the lingering Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist government. Politically, Taiwan resides in between the competing imperialist discourses of the People’s Republic of China, which has long articulated a goal of “retaking” or “reunifying” the island it claims as a renegade province, and the United States, a nation that has demonstrated an ambivalent stance toward Taiwan and expressions of its independence. As such, it has been appropriated as a space on which to bargain the terms of US–China foreign policy—and negotiate away the island’s right to self-determination—since the 1970s.

Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) culminated in the Shanghai Communiqué, which expressed what would become the United States’ guiding foreign policy principle of One China, with Taiwan subsumed as part of China. Taiwan was thus used as a negotiating tool to solidify a new partnership between the United States and the PRC. The United States expressed its acknowledgment for the idea “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” and declared, “The United States Government does not challenge that position.” By 1979 the United States had pulled military personnel out of Taiwan and severed governmental recognition of the Republic of China. In the space that is in and between occupation, and in between US–China foreign policy, Taiwan has been constituted by colonial and imperial imaginations of its utility and futurity.

The following collective statement represents an intention to articulate and organize a new possibility for Taiwan and its independence. It was crafted as a response to the controversial December 2, 2016, phone call between Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-Wen, and Donald Trump, which presented a new dynamic of [End Page 465] in-betweenness, one that catapulted the question of Taiwan independence from the margins to center stage. Much of the reaction to the call revolved around two general sentiments of panic and potential. US foreign policy experts were anxious to preserve the One China status quo, while many in Taiwan and the Taiwanese diaspora of the United States were cautiously hopeful that it signaled the possibility for renewed American support, especially in regard to independence. Taiwan independence, it is often understood, cannot be practically achieved without the backing of American militarized security. In this statement, a growing contingent of Taiwanese and Taiwanese American scholars, activists, artists, and people in solidarity argue for a reimagination of the possibilities of the in-between to move beyond tactics of dollar diplomacy and hopeful anticipation of American approval, toward more sustainable projects of global solidarity with decolonial justice movements around the world. We offer this perspective as an alternative to the hegemonic logic under which Taiwan independence must be practically aligned with American Empire and bolstered by American militarized peace. Instead, this collective statement attempts to highlight the entrapment such thinking produces and the violent present moment that so-called US security has generated, especially under Trump’s increasingly fascist America. Within this context, we intend for this statement to further transpacific conversations, collaborations, and new configurations for imagining Taiwan and the possibility of independence during these times.